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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [EAID](#) [PINR](#) [SOCI](#) [SO](#) [ET](#)

SUBJECT: SOMALIA - PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBES TFG OPPONENTS,  
UNREALIZED FINANCIAL PLEDGES BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,  
EFFORTS AT FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY

REF: NAIROBI 1105

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Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 b,d  
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11. (C) Summary: At a June 2 evening meeting with acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff and Ambassadors Yamamoto and Swan, TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke described recent battlefield successes in Mogadishu where fighting continues, the state of negotiations with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, and the state of the mostly unrealized financial pledges to the government. Negotiations with Price Waterhouse for financial management assistance were near conclusion. Sharmarke hoped they would lead to increased transparency and, with it, an less reluctance in the international community to aid the TFG. In spite of pressure from the SRSG, the Embassy, and others, President Sharif was still considering travel to Rome at the invitation of Prime Minister Berlusconi. End summary.

TFG Preserves Gains  
in Mogadishu  
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12. (C) At a June 2 evening meeting, TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke described to visiting acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff and Ambassadors Yamamoto and Swan June 2 successes against insurgents on the battlefield in Mogadishu. Sharmarke's account largely tracked with reftel account of TFG advances in Yaqshiid, Dharkeynley and Medina districts. (The fighting seesawed on June 3, with the TFG roughly preserving its June 1 - 2 gains.)

Ammunition Needed  
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13. (C) Sharmarke reported that the TFG ammunition stocks were dwindling and urged USG assistance in replenishing them. He understood that there had been difficulty in arranging transportation from Entebbe, but urged continued USG engagement.

Additional Potential Allies  
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14. (C) The TFG was continuing efforts to broaden its base. Rahanweyn Resistance forces in Baidoa were ready to move to Hudur. The TFG remained on the horns of its dilemma with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) which, if it received TFG assistance and scored battlefield successes, might demand more concessions in exchange for cooperation with Sharmarke's government. Sharmarke believed that ASWJ needed pressure

--from Ethiopia, the USG, or both-- to cooperate with the TFG. He guessed that those ASWJ operatives in Somalia's central regions were receiving support from the GoE. (Note: reports from Mogadishu June 4 suggested that the TFG may have had some success in forging a relationship in a meeting between President Sharif and a large number of ASWJ representatives in Mogadishu.)

#### TFG Opponents

15. (C) The Prime Minister said that ARS-Asmara's Hassan Dahir Aweys had "sent a message through religious leaders that he wanted to talk" to the TFG. Sharmarke suspected Aweys of attempting to buy time or sow uncertainty in the TFG, now that the government had registered success on the battlefield. Aweys's overture, he said, made it all the more important that the TFG have sufficient ammunition to continue its counter-attack.

16. (C) Turning his attention to other personalities, Sharmarke noted that al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi "Godane," aka Abu Zubayr, was the TFG's cleverest foe. The significant al-Shabaab presence in Deyninle's heavily Murosade district of Mogadishu, Sharmarke speculated, had caused "Godane" to replace al-Shabaab Spokesman Muhtar Robow with Murosade clan member Hassan Raghe, who was also working hard to reconcile al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam.

17. (C) Sharmarke confessed that one of the TFG's most serious miscalculations had been its bet that former Kismaayo Mayor Ahmed Madobe would, after being freed from an Ethiopian jail as a result of the intervention of President Sherif, cooperate with the TFG in undermining the al-Shabaab administration there. He had not, and the TFG's "Trojan

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horse" strategy had failed.

(C) The most uncompromising opponents of the TFG, Sharmarke thought, were Aweys, "Godane," Robow, Hisbul Islam's Omar Iman and Adullahi Ali Hashi. Sharmarke did not expect them to cooperate with the TFG, no matter what the circumstances.

#### Aid From Djibouti

18. (C) The Prime Minister was grateful for the two small shipments of ammunition supplied by the Djibouti government. Some of the ammunition, however, was not compatible with the TFG weapons, while the small number of RPG shells provided only a few days' supply for TFG troops, however.

19. (C) DAS Wycoff urged Sharmarke to provide Somalia Unit with any concrete information he government developed on flights transporting insurgents or supplies for al-Shabaab. Sharmarke fingered unnamed businessmen in the Somali communications sector for funding al-Shabaab. Some businessmen were committed to opposing the TFG, he said, while others were "riding two horses."

#### Aid Pledges Largely Unrealized

10. (C) International promises of aid to the TFG had for the most part not materialized, Sharmarke said. When he came to power, Sheikh Sharif thought that Saudi Arabia would supply support. Its passivity, Sharmarke thought, might be traceable to lingering suspicions from Sharif's closer relationship with Qatar when he was a member of the ICU. Kuwait and the UAE "could be more involved," as well, although Sharmarke acknowledged that the UAE had pledged USD 12 million to AMISOM and USD 6 million to the TFG.

11. (C) Sharmarke's just-completed trip to Libya had revealed

that the USD 2 million pledged by Qadhafi was being funneled via a private foundation in Dubai, which was shipping tents and medicine for IDPs to Somalia. President Bashir had provided no aid to the Sharif government, while the Kenyan government could not even be induced to prevent TFG opponents from crossing its border. Sharmarke renewed his request that the USG somehow induce the Government of Iraq to make good on its promise of USD 5 million to the TFG.

Efforts to Ensure  
Financial Transparency  
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¶12. (C) Although the TFG was preoccupied with on-going hostilities in Mogadishu, it understood that financial transparency was essential to inducing donors to make good on their pledges, and in inspiring confidence among Somalis. Negotiations with Price Waterhouse were in "the final stages." Sharmarke hoped the arrangement would produce a certifiably transparent budget process and produce useful advice on financial administration for the TFG.

Sharif to Travel to Rome  
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¶13. (C) Finally, Sharmarke acknowledged that efforts by the SRSG, the Somalia Unit, and himself to discourage President Sharif from attending the June 9 - 10 Rome ICG had possibly been trumped by what he said was an invitation from Prime Minister Berlusconi. (Contacts in Villa Somalia, Mogadishu, told us June 5 that Sharif was still undecided. Somalia Unit has scheduled a telcon with Sharif with ADAS Wycoff for afternoon, June 5.

¶14. (U) ADAS Wycoff approved the release of this message.  
RANNEBERGER